The Project Gutenberg eBook of Ethics — Part 3, by Benedictus de Spinoza

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Benedict de Spinoza,backyard playsets for 3 year olds under 100 dollars THE ETHICS
(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
Translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes

PART III: ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS

Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seemto be treating rather of matters outside nature than of naturalphenomena following nature's general laws. They appear toconceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within akingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than followsnature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions,and that he is determined solely by himself. They attributehuman infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of naturein general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man,which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, asusually happens, abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting offthe weakness of the human mind more eloquently or moreacutely than his fellows, is looked upon as a seer. Still therehas been no lack of very excellent men (to whose toil andindustry I confess myself much indebted), who have writtenmany noteworthy things concerning the right way of life,and have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one,so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of theemotions, and the power of the mind against them for theirrestraint.

I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though hebelieved, that the mind has absolute power over its actions,strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes,and, at the same time, to point out a way, by which the mindmight attain to absolute dominion over them. However,in my opinion, he accomplishes nothing beyond a displayof the acuteness of his own great intellect, as I will showin the proper place. For the present I wish to revert tothose, who would rather abuse or deride human emotionsthan understand them. Such persons will, doubtless thinkit strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice andfolly geometrically, and should wish to set forth with rigidreasoning those matters which they cry out against asrepugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful.However, such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature,which can be set down to a flaw therein; for nature is alwaysthe same, and everywhere one and the same in her efficacyand power of action; that is, nature's laws and ordinances,whereby all things come to pass and change from one formto another, are everywhere and always the same; so thatthere should be one and the same method of understandingthe nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature'suniversal laws and rules. Thus the passions of hatred, anger,envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow from thissame necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to certaindefinite causes, through which they are understood, andpossess certain properties as worthy of being known asthe properties of anything else, whereof the contemplationin itself affords us delight. I shall, therefore, treat of thenature and strength of the emotions according to the samemethod, as I employed heretofore in my investigationsconcerning God and the mind. I shall consider humanactions and desires in exactly the same manner, as thoughI were concerned with lines, planes, and solids.

DEFINITIONS

I. By an 'adequate' cause, I mean a cause through whichits effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived. By an'inadequate' or partial cause, I mean a cause through which,by itself, its effect cannot be understood.

II. I say that we 'act' when anything takes place, eitherwithin us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequatecause; that is (by the foregoing definition) when throughour nature something takes place within us or externallyto us, which can through our nature alone be clearly anddistinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that weare passive as regards something when that somethingtakes place within us, or follows from our nature externally,we being only the partial cause.

III. By 'emotion' I mean the modifications of the body,whereby the active power of the said body is increasedor diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideasof such modifications.

N.B. If we can be the adequate cause of any of thesemodifications, I then call the emotion an activity,otherwise I call it a passion, or state wherein the mindis passive.

POSTULATES

I. The human body can be affected in many ways, wherebyits power of activity is increased or diminished, and alsoin other ways which do not render its power of activityeither greater or less.

N.B. This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and
Lemmas v. and vii., which see after II. xiii.

II. The human body can undergo many changes, and,nevertheless, retain the impressions or traces of objects(cf. II. Post. v.), and, consequently, the same imagesof things (see note II. xvii.).

PROPOSITIONS

I. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain casespassive. In so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarilyactive, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it isnecessarily passive.

>>>>>Proof—In every human mind there are someadequate ideas, and some ideas that are fragmentaryand confused (II. xl. note). Those ideas which areadequate in the mind are adequate also in God, inasmuchas he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl. Cor.),and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise(by the same Cor.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as hecontains in himself the essence of the given mind alone,but as he, at the same time, contains the minds of otherthings. Again, from any given idea some effect mustnecessarily follow (I. xxxvi.); of this effect God is theadequate cause (III. Def. i.), not inasmuch as he isinfinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as affected bythe given idea (II. ix.). But of that effect whereof Godis the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea whichis adequate in a given mind, of that effect, I repeat, themind in question is the adequate cause (II. xi. Cor.).Therefore our mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas(III. Def. ii.), is in certain cases necessarily active;this was our first point. Again, whatsoever necessarilyfollows from the idea which is adequate in God, not byvirtue of his possessing in himself the mind of one manonly, but by virtue of his containing, together with themind of that one man, the minds of other things also,of such an effect (II. xi. Cor.) the mind of the given manis not an adequate, but only a partial cause; thus(III. Def. ii.) the mind, inasmuch as it has inadequateideas, is in certain cases necessarily passive; this wasour second point. Therefore our mind, &c. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—Hence it follows that the mind is moreor less liable to be acted upon, in proportion as it possessesinadequate ideas, and, contrariwise, is more or less activein proportion as it possesses adequate ideas.

II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can minddetermine body to motion or rest or any state differentfrom these, if such there be.

>>>>>Proof—All modes of thinking have for their causeGod, by virtue of his being a thinking thing, and not byvirtue of his being displayed under any other attribute (II.vi.). That, therefore, which determines the mind to thoughtis a mode of thought, and not a mode of extension; thatis (II. Def. i.), it is not body. This was our first point.Again, the motion and rest of a body must arise fromanother body, which has also been determined to a stateof motion or rest by a third body, and absolutelyeverything which takes place in a body must spring fromGod, in so far as he is regarded as affected by somemode of extension, and not by some mode of thought(II. vi.); that is, it cannot spring from the mind, whichis a mode of thought. This was our second point.Therefore body cannot determine mind, &c. Q.E.D.

*****Note—This is made more clear by what was saidin the note to II. vii., namely, that mind and body are oneand the same thing, conceived first under the attribute ofthought, secondly, under the attribute of extension. Thusit follows that the order or concatenation of things is identical,whether nature be conceived under the one attribute or theother; consequently the order of states of activity andpassivity in our body is simultaneous in nature with theorder of states of activity and passivity in the mind.The same conclusion is evident from the manner in whichwe proved II. xii.

Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though therebe no further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe,until the fact is proved by experience, that men can beinduced to consider the question calmly and fairly, so firmlyare they convinced that it is merely at the bidding of themind, that the body is set in motion or at rest, or performsa variety of actions depending solely on the mind's willor the exercise of thought. However, no one has hithertolaid down the limits to the powers of the body, that is, noone has as yet been taught by experience what the bodycan accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far asshe is regarded as extension. No one hitherto has gainedsuch an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, thathe can explain all its functions; nor need I call attentionto the fact that many actions are observed in the loweranimals, which far transcend human sagacity, andthat somnambulists do many things in their sleep, whichthey would not venture to do when awake: these instancesare enough to show, that the body can by the sole lawsof its nature do many things which the mind wonders at.

Again, no one knows how or by what means the mindmoves the body, nor how many various degrees of motionit can impart to the body, nor how quickly it can move it.Thus, when men say that this or that physical action hasits origin in the mind, which latter has dominion over thebody, they are using words without meaning, or areconfessing in specious phraseology that they are ignorantof the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at it.

But, they will say, whether we know or do not know themeans whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, atany rate, experience of the fact that unless the human mindis in a fit state to think, the body remains inert. Moreover,we have experience, that the mind alone can determinewhether we speak or are silent, and a variety of similarstates which, accordingly, we say depend on the mind'sdecree. But, as to the first point, I ask such objectors,whether experience does not also teach, that if the bodybe inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted forthinking? For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mindsimultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has nopower of thinking, such as it possesses when the bodyis awake. Again, I think everyone's experience willconfirm the statement, that the mind is not at all timesequally fit for thinking on a given subject, but accordingas the body is more or less fitted for being stimulated bythe image of this or that object, so also is the mind moreor less fitted for contemplating the said object.

But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely fromthe laws of nature considered as extended substance,we should be able to deduce the causes of buildings,pictures, and things of that kind, which are producedonly by human art; nor would the human body, unlessit were determined and led by the mind, be capable ofbuilding a single temple. However, I have just pointedout that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the body'spower, or say what can be concluded from a considerationof its sole nature, whereas they have experience of manythings being accomplished solely by the laws of nature,which they would never have believed possible exceptunder the direction of mind: such are the actions performedby somnambulists while asleep, and wondered at by theirperformers when awake. I would further call attentionto the mechanism of the human body, which far surpassesin complexity all that has been put together by human art,not to repeat what I have already shown, namely, thatfrom nature, under whatever attribute she be considered,infinite results follow. As for the second objection, Isubmit that the world would be much happier, if men wereas fully able to keep silence as they are to speak.Experience abundantly shows that men can govern anythingmore easily than their tongues, and restrain anything moreeasily than their appetites; when it comes about that many believe, that we are only free in respect to objects whichwe moderately desire, because our desire for such caneasily be controlled by the thought of something elsefrequently remembered, but that we are by no means freein respect to what we seek with violent emotion, for ourdesire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance ofanything else. However, unless such persons had provedby experience that we do many things which we afterwardsrepent of, and again that we often, when assailed by contraryemotions, see the better and follow the worse, there wouldbe nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in allthings. Thus an infant believes that of its own free will itdesires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desiresto run away; further, a drunken man believes that he uttersfrom the free decision of his mind words which, when heis sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus, too, adelirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and othersof like complexion, believe that they speak from the freedecision of their mind, when they are in reality unable torestrain their impulse to talk. Experience teaches us noless clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to befree, simply because they are conscious of their actions,and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions aredetermined; and, further, it is plain that the dictates of themind are but another name for the appetites, and thereforevary according to the varying state of the body. Everyoneshapes his actions according to his emotion, those who areassailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish;those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayedthis way or that. All these considerations clearly show thata mental decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state,are simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, whichwe call decision, when it is regarded under and explainedthrough the attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, whenit is regarded under the attribute of extension, and deducedfrom the laws of motion and rest. This will appear yet moreplainly in the sequel. For the present I wish to call attentionto another point, namely, that we cannot act by the decisionof the mind, unless we have a remembrance of having doneso. For instance, we cannot say a word without rememberingthat we have done so. Again, it is not within the free powerof the mind to remember or forget a thing at will. Thereforethe freedom of the mind must in any case be limited to thepower of uttering or not uttering something which it remembers.But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we speakfrom a free decision of the mind, yet we do not speak, or, if wedo, it is by a spontaneous motion of the body. Again, wedream that we are concealing something, and we seem to actfrom the same decision of the mind as that, whereby we keepsilence when awake concerning something we know. Lastly,we dream that from the free decision of our mind we dosomething, which we should not dare to do when awake.

Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind twosorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free?If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must necessarilyadmit, that the decision of the mind, which is believed to befree, is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory,and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an idea, byvirtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II. xlix.).Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind bythe same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing.Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silenceor act in any way from the free decision of their mind, dobut dream with their eyes open.

III. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequateideas; the passive states of the mind depend solelyon inadequate ideas.

>>>>>Proof—The first element, which constitutes the essenceof the mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existentbody (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is compounded of manyother ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate(II. xxix. Cor., II. xxxviii. Cor.). Whatsoever therefore followsfrom the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate cause,through which it must be understood, must necessarily followeither from an adequate or from an inadequate idea. But inso far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is necessarilypassive: wherefore the activities of the mind follow solely fromadequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only passive in sofar as it has inadequate ideas. Q.E.D.

*****Note—Thus we see, that passive states are notattributed to the mind, except in so far as it contains somethinginvolving negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part ofnature, which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceivedthrough itself without other parts: I could thus show, thatpassive states are attributed to individual things in the sameway that they are attributed to the mind, and that they cannototherwise be perceived, but my purpose is solely to treatof the human mind.

IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external toitself.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition is self-evident, for thedefinition of anything affirms the essence of that thing, butdoes not negative it; in other words, it postulates the essenceof the thing, but does not take it away. So long therefore aswe regard only the thing itself, without taking into accountexternal causes, we shall not be able to find in it anythingwhich could destroy it. Q.E.D.

V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the sameobject, in so far as one is capable of destroying the other.

>>>>>Proof—If they could agree together or co-exist in the sameobject, there would then be in the said object something whichcould destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is absurd,therefore things, &c. Q.E.D.

VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist inits own being.

>>>>>Proof—Individual things are modes whereby theattributes of God are expressed in a given determinate manner(I. xxv.Cor.); that is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things which expressin a given determinate manner the power of God, wherebyGod is and acts; now no thing contains in itself anythingwhereby it can be destroyed, or which can take away itsexistence (III. iv.); but contrariwise it is opposed to all thatcould take away its existence (III. v.). Therefore, in so far asit can, and in so far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persistin its own being. Q.E.D.

VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours topersist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essenceof the thing in question.

>>>>>Proof—From the given essence of any thing certainconsequences necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.), nor have things anypower save such as necessarily follows from their nature asdetermined (I. xxix.); wherefore the power of any given thing,or the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things,it acts, or endeavours to act, that is (III. vi.), the power orendeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being,is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing inquestion. Q.E.D.

VIII. The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persistin its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.

>>>>>Proof—If it involved a limited time, which should determinethe duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from thatpower whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not existbeyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed; butthis (III. iv.) is absurd. Wherefore the endeavour wherewith athing exists involves no definite time; but, contrariwise, since(III. iv.) it will by the same power whereby it already existsalways continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some externalcause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time.

IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, andalso in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in itsbeing for an indefinite period, and of this endeavour it is conscious.

>>>>>Proof—The essence of the mind is constituted by adequateand inadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so faras it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the latter,it endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for an indefinitetime (III. viii.). Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is necessarily consciousof itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body, the mindis therefore (III. vii.) conscious of its own endeavour.

*****Note—This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, iscalled "will," when referred to the mind and body in conjunction itis called "appetite"; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's essence,from the nature of which necessarily follow all those results whichtend to its preservation; and which man has thus been determinedto perform.

Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference, exceptthat the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as theyare conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly be thus defined:"Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof." It is thus plain fromwhat has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, longfor, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on theother hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it,wish for it, long for it, or desire it.

X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body, cannot bepostulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.

>>>>>Proof—Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot bepostulated therein (III. v.). Therefore neither can the idea of sucha thing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II. ix.Cor.); that is (II. xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing cannot be postulatedas in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II. xi., xiii.) the first element,that constitutes the essence of the mind, is the idea of the humanbody as actually existing, it follows that the first and chief endeavourof our mind is the endeavour to affirm the existence of our body:thus, an idea, which negatives the existence of our body, is contraryto our mind, &c. Q.E.D.

XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the powerof activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helpsor hinders the power of thought in our mind.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II. xiv.

*****Note—Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes,and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimesto a state of lesser perfection. These passive states of transitionexplain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain. By "pleasure"therefore in the following propositions I shall signify "a passive statewherein the mind passes to a greater perfection." By "pain" I shallsignify "a passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection."Further, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mindtogether I shall call "stimulation" (titillatio) or "merriment" (hilaritas),the emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call "suffering" or"melancholy." But we must bear in mind, that stimulation andsuffering are attributed to man, when one part of his nature is moreaffected than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all partsare alike affected. What I mean by desire I have explained in thenote to Prop. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize noother primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all otheremotions arise from these three. But, before I go further, I shouldlike here to explain at greater length Prop. x. of this part, in orderthat we may clearly understand how one idea is contrary to another.In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the idea, which constitutesthe essence of mind, involves the existence of body, so long asthe body itself exists. Again, it follows from what we pointed outin the Corollary to II. viii., that the present existence of our minddepends solely on the fact, that the mind involves the actualexistence of the body. Lastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. andNote) that the power of the mind, whereby it imagines andremembers things, also depends on the fact, that it involves theactual existence of the body. Whence it follows, that the presentexistence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed,as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of thebody. Now the cause, why the mind ceases to affirm thisexistence of the body, cannot be the mind itself (III. iv.), noragain the fact that the body ceases to exist. For (by II. vi.)the cause, why the mind affirms the existence of the body,is not that the body began to exist; therefore, for the samereason, it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body,because the body ceases to exist; but (II. xvii.) this resultfollows from another idea, which excludes the presentexistence of our body and, consequently, of our mind, andwhich is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essenceof our mind.

XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive thosethings, which increase or help the power of activity in the body.

>>>>>Proof—So long as the human body is affected in a mode,which involves the nature of any external body, the human mindwill regard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and consequently(II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an external body aspresent, that is (II. xvii. Note), conceives it, the human body isaffected in a mode, which involves the nature of the said externalbody; thus so long as the mind conceives things, which increaseor help the power of activity in our body, the body is affected inmodes which increase or help its power of activity (III. Post. i.);consequently (III. xi.) the mind's power of thinking is for thatperiod increased or helped. Thus (III. vi., ix.) the mind, as faras it can, endeavours to imagine such things. Q.E.D.

XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder thebody's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as possible, toremember things which exclude the existence of the first-namedthings.

>>>>>Proof—So long as the mind conceives anything of the kindalluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished orconstrained (cf. III. xii. Proof); nevertheless it will continue toconceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which excludesthe present existence thereof (II. xvii.); that is (as I have just shown),the power of the mind and of the body is diminished, or constrained,until the mind conceives something else, which excludes theexistence of the former thing conceived: therefore the mind (III. ix.),as far as it can, will endeavour to conceive or remember the latter.Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—Hence it follows that the mind shrinks fromconceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power ofitself and of the body.

*****Note—From what has been said we may clearly understandthe nature of Love and Hate. "Love" is nothing else but "pleasureaccompanied by the idea of an external cause." We further see,that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have, and to keeppresent to him, the object of his love; while he who hates endeavoursto remove and destroy the object of his hatred. But I will treat ofthese matters at more length hereafter.

XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at thesame time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of thesetwo, be also affected by the other.

>>>>>Proof—If the human body has once been affected by twobodies at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one ofthem, it will straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.). Butthe mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our bodythan the nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Cor. ii.); therefore, ifthe body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been onceaffected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it isafterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by theother.

XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain,or desire.

>>>>>Proof—Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneouslyaffected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nordiminishes its power of activity, and the other does either increaseor diminish the said power (III. Post. i.). From the foregoingproposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is afterwardsaffected by the former, through its true cause, which (by hypothesis)neither increases nor diminishes its power of action, it will be atthe same time affected by the latter, which does increase ordiminish its power of activity, that is (III. xi. note) it will be affectedwith pleasure or pain. Thus the former of the two emotions will,not through itself, but accidentally, be the cause of pleasure orpain. In the same way also it can be easily shown, that a thingmay be accidentally the cause of desire. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—Simply from the fact that we have regardeda thing with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing benot the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate it.

>>>>>Proof—For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), thatthe mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with theemotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note), according asthe power of the mind and body may be increased or diminished,&c.; and consequently (III. xii.), according as the mind maydesire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii. Cor.), in otherwords (III. xiii. note), according as it may love or hate the same.Q.E.D.

*****Note—Hence we understand how it may happen, that welove or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being knownto us; merely, as a phrase is, from "sympathy" or "antipathy." Weshould refer to the same category those objects, which affect uspleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble otherobjects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in thenext Prop. I am aware that certain authors, who were the first tointroduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to signifythereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I think we maybe permitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifestqualities.

XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given objecthas some point of resemblance with another object which is wontto affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the point ofresemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions, weshall still regard the first-named object with love or hate.

>>>>>Proof—The point of resemblance was in the object (byhypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus(III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it willstraightway be affected by one or the other emotion, andconsequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same pointof resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of pleasureor pain. Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although the pointin which the two objects resemble one another be not theefficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the first-namedobject with love or hate. Q.E.D.

XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect uspainfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing whichis wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure,we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shalllove it.

>>>>>Proof—The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a causeof pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with thisemotion, we shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceive thatit has some point of resemblance to something else, which is wontto affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shallwith an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it (III. xvi.); thuswe shall both hate and love the same thing. Q.E.D.

*****Note—This disposition of the mind, which arises from twocontrary emotions, is called "vacillation"; it stands to the emotionsin the same relation as doubt does to the imagination (II. xliv. note);vacillation and doubt do not differ one from the other, except asgreater differs from less. But we must bear in mind that I havededuced this vacillation from causes, which give rise throughthemselves to one of the emotions, and to the other accidentally.I have done this, in order that they might be more easily deducedfrom what went before; but I do not deny that vacillation of thedisposition generally arises from an object, which is the efficientcause of both emotions. The human body is composed(II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts of different nature,and may therefore (Ax. i. after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) beaffected in a variety of different ways by one and the same body;and contrariwise, as one and the same thing can be affected inmany ways, it can also in many different ways affect one andthe same part of the body. Hence we can easily conceive, thatone and the same object may be the cause of many andconflicting emotions.

XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfullyby the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thingpresent.

>>>>>Proof—So long as a man is affected by the image ofanything, he will regard that thing as present, even though it benon-existent (II. xvii. and Cor.), he will not conceive it as pastor future, except in so far as its image is joined to the imageof time past or future (II. xliv. note). Wherefore the image ofa thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether it be referredto time past, time future, or time present; that is (II. xvi. Cor.), thedisposition or emotion of the body is identical, whether the imagebe of a thing past or future. Q.E.D.

*****Note I.—I call a thing past or future, according as we eitherhave been or shall be affected thereby. For instance, accordingas we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it hasrecreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us,or will harm us. For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm itsexistence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion whichexcludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.) thebody is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way as ifthe thing were actually present. However, as it generally happensthat those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so long asthey regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in doubt aboutits issue (II. xliv. note); it follows that the emotions which arise fromsimilar images of things are not so constant, but are generallydisturbed by the images of other things, until men become assuredof the issue.

*****Note II.—From what has just been said, we understand whatis meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, andDisappointment. "Hope" is nothing else but "an inconstant pleasure,arising from the image of something future or past, whereof we donot yet know the issue." "Fear," on the other hand, is "an inconstantpain also arising from the image of something concerning which weare in doubt." If the element of doubt be removed from theseemotions, hope becomes "Confidence" and fear becomes "Despair."In other words, "Pleasure or Pain arising from the image ofsomething concerning which we have hoped or feared." Again,"Joy" is "Pleasure arising from the image of something past whereofwe have doubted the issue." "Disappointment" is "the Pain opposedto Joy."

XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyedwill feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved he will feel pleasure.

>>>>>Proof—The mind, as far as possible, endeavours toconceive those things which increase or help the body's powerof activity (III. xii.); in other words (III. xii. note), those thingswhich it loves. But conception is helped by those things whichpostulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hinderedby those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.);therefore the images of things, which postulate the existenceof an object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceivethe object of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mindpleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude the existenceof an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental endeavour; inother words, affect the mind painfully. He, therefore, whoconceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain,&c. Q.E.D.

XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed willalso feel pleasure.

>>>>>Proof—The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive thosethings, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body'spower of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III. xiii.note), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude theexistence of what it hates; therefore the image of a thing, whichexcludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the aforesaidmental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects the mindpleasurably. Thus he who conceives that the object of his hateis destroyed will feel pleasure. Q.E.D.

XXI. He who conceives, that the object of his love is affectedpleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected pleasurably orpainfully; and the one or the other emotion will be greater or lessin the lover according as it is greater or less in the thing loved.

>>>>>Proof—The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.)which postulate the existence of the object of love, help themind's endeavour to conceive the said object. But pleasurepostulates the existence of something feeling pleasure, so muchthe more in proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater;for it is (III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection; thereforethe image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mentalendeavour of the lover; that is, it affects the lover pleasurably,and so much the more, in proportion as this emotion may havebeen greater in the object of love. This was our first point.Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it is to thatextent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to the amountof pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III. xix.) he who conceives,that the object of his love is affected painfully, will himself beaffected painfully, in proportion as the said emotion is greateror less in the object of love. Q.E.D.

XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects someobject of our love, we shall be affected with love towards thatthing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an object ofour love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred towards it.

>>>>>Proof—He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the objectof our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully—that is, if weconceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasureor pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to cometo us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore(III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object ofour love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with loveor hatred towards him. Q.E.D.

*****Note—Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of 'Pity,' whichwe may define as 'pain arising from another's hurt.' What termwe can use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not.

We will call the 'love towards him who confers a benefit onanother,' 'Approval;' and the 'hatred towards him who injuresanother,' we will call 'Indignation.' We must further remark,that we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (asshown in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hithertoregarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resemblesourselves (as I will show presently). Thus, we bestow approvalon one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and,contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.

XXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is painfullyaffected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he thinks that the saidobject is pleasurably affected, he will feel pain. Each of theseemotions will be greater or less, according as its contrary is greateror less in the object of hatred.

>>>>>Proof—In so far as an object of hatred is painfully affected,it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the strength of thepain (III. xi. note). Therefore, he (III. xx.) who conceives, thatsome object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure,to an extent proportioned to the amount of pain he conceivesin the object of his hatred. This was our first point. Again,pleasure postulates the existence of the pleasurably affectedthing (III. xi. note), in proportion as the pleasure is greater orless. If anyone imagines that an object of his hatred is pleasurablyaffected, this conception (III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavourto persist; in other words (III. xi. note), he who hates will bepainfully affected. Q.E.D.

*****Note—This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, andwithout any mental conflict. For (as I am about to show in Prop.xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar tohimself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in likemanner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrarycircumstances. But here we are regarding hatred only.

XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an objectof our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If weconceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall feellove towards him.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition is proved in the same way as III.xxii., which see.

*****Note—These and similar emotions of hatred are attributableto 'envy,' which, accordingly, is nothing else but 'hatred, in so faras it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's hurt,and to grieve at another's advantage.'

XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, andconcerning what we love, everything that we can conceiveto affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object.Contrariwise, we endeavour to negative everything, whichwe conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object.

>>>>>Proof—That, which we conceive to affect an objectof our love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurablyor painfully (III. xxi.). But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, asfar as possible, to conceive those things which affect uspleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Cor.), it endeavoursto regard them as present. And, contrariwise (III. xiii.), itendeavours to exclude the existence of such things as affectus painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm concerningourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever weconceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably.Q.E.D.

XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate,everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and,contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everythingwhich we conceive to affect it pleasurably.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as theforegoing proposition followed from III. xxi.

*****Note—Thus we see that it may readily happen, that aman may easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object,and, contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This feelingis called 'pride,' in reference to the man who thinks too highlyof himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreamswith his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all thingsthat fall within the scope of his conception, and thereuponaccounting them real, and exulting in them, so long as he isunable to conceive anything which excludes their existence,and determines his own power of action. 'Pride,' therefore,is 'pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself.'Again, the 'pleasure which arises from a man thinking toohighly of another' is called 'over-esteem.' Whereas the'pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man' iscalled 'disdain.'

XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is likeourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion,to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected witha like emotion (affectus).

>>>>>Proof—The images of things are modifications of thehuman body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies aspresent to us (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof theideas involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time,the nature of the external bodies as present. If, therefore,the nature of the external body be similar to the nature of ourbody, then the idea which we form of the external body willinvolve a modification of our own body similar to themodification of the external body. Consequently, if weconceive anyone similar to ourselves as affected by anyemotion, this conception will express a modification of ourbody similar to that emotion. Thus, from the fact ofconceiving a thing like ourselves to be affected with anyemotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion.If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we shall,to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not similar,emotion. Q.E.D.

*****Note I—This imitation of emotions, when it is referredto pain, is called "compassion" (cf. III. xxii. note); when it isreferred to desire, it is called "emulation," which is nothingelse but "the desire of anything, engendered in us by the factthat we conceive that others have the like desire."

<<<<<Corollary I—If we conceive that anyone, whom wehave hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affectssomething similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with lovetowards him. If, on the other hand, we conceive that hepainfully affects the same, we shall be affected with hatredtowards him.

>>>>>Proof—This is proved from the last proposition in thesame manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.

<<<<<Corollary II—We cannot hate a thing which we pity,because its misery affects us painfully.

>>>>>Proof—If we could hate it for this reason, we shouldrejoice in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

<<<<<Corollary III—We seek to free from misery, as far aswe can, a thing which we pity.

>>>>>Proof—That, which painfully affects the object ofour pity, affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoingproposition); therefore, we shall endeavour to recalleverything which removes its existence, or which destroysit (cf. III. xiii.); in other words (III. ix. note), we shall desireto destroy it, or we shall be determined for its destruction;thus, we shall endeavour to free from misery a thing whichwe pity. Q.E.D.

*****Note II—This will or appetite for doing good, whicharises from pity of the thing whereon we would confer abenefit, is called "benevolence," and is nothing else but "desirearising from compassion." Concerning love or hate towardshim who has done good or harm to something, which weconceive to be like ourselves, see III. xxii. note.

XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever weconceive to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour toremove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be trulyrepugnant thereto, or to conduce to pain.

>>>>>Proof—We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceivethat which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); inother words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as faras possible as present or actually existing. But the endeavourof the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, andsimultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body'spower of action. (This is clear from II. vii. Cor. and II. xi.Cor.). Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for itsexistence, in other words (which by III. ix., note, come to thesame thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first point.Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed tobe the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we hate,is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.). We shall, therefore(by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy thesame, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may notregard it as present; this was our second point. Whereforewhatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c. Q.E.D.

XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever weconceive men* to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise weshall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrinkfrom.

[*N.B. By "men" in this and the following propositions, Imean men whom we regard without any particular emotion.]

>>>>>Proof—From the fact of imagining, that men love orhate anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.).That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel pleasureor pain at the thing's presence. And so we shall endeavour todo whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with pleasure,etc. Q.E.D.

*****Note—This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone,solely in order to please men, we call "ambition," especiallywhen we so eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that wedo or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt: in othercases it is generally called "kindliness." Furthermore I give thename of "praise" to the "pleasure, with which we conceive theaction of another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us";but of "blame" to the "pain wherewith we feel aversion to hisaction."

XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceivesas affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected bypleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; inother words, he will regard himself with pleasure. On theother hand, if he has done anything which he conceives asaffecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain.

>>>>>Proof—He who conceives, that he affects otherswith pleasure or pain, will, by that very fact, himself beaffected with pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II.xix. and xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modificationswhereby he is determined to action, it follows that he whoconceives, that he affects others pleasurably, will be affectedwith pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; inother words, he will regard himself with pleasure. And so"mutatis mutandis" in the case of pain. Q.E.D.

*****Note—As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied bythe idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompaniedby the idea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain inquestion will be a species of love and hatred. But, as the termslove and hatred are used in reference to external objects, wewill employ other names for the emotions now under discussion:pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause we willstyle "Honour," and the emotion contrary thereto we will style"Shame": I mean in such cases as where pleasure or painarises from a man's belief, that he is being praised or blamed:otherwise pleasure accompanied by the idea of an externalcause is called "self-complacency," and its contrary pain iscalled "repentance." Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Cor.)that the pleasure, wherewith a man conceives that he affectsothers, may exist solely in his own imagination, and as (III.xxv.) everyone endeavours to conceive concerning himselfthat which he conceives will affect him with pleasure, it mayeasily come to pass that a vain man may be proud and mayimagine that he is pleasing to all, when in reality he may bean annoyance to all.

XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hatesanything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shallthereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfastlove, &c. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinksfrom something that we love, we shall undergo vacillationsof soul.

>>>>>Proof—From the mere fact of conceiving that anyoneloves anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.):but we are assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, anew cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered;hence we shall thereupon love it more steadfastly. Again,from the mere fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks fromanything, we shall ourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.).If we assume that we at the same time love it, we shall thensimultaneously love it and shrink from it; in other words, weshall be subject to vacillation (III. xvii. note). Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—From the foregoing, and also from III.xxviii. it follows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible,to cause others to love what he himself loves, and to hate whathe himself hates: as the poet* says: "As lover let us share everyhope and every fear: ironhearted were he who should lovewhat the other leaves."**[* Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5][** Spinoza transposes the verses: "Speremus pariter, paritermetuamus amantes; Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."]

*****Note—This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likesand dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really ambition(see III. xxix. note); wherefore we see that everyone by naturedesires (appetere), that the rest of mankind should live accordingto his own individual disposition: when such a desire is equallypresent in all, everyone stands in everyone else's way, and inwishing to be loved or praised by all, all become mutually hateful.

XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something,which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour to bringit about that the man in question shall not gain possession thereof.

>>>>>Proof—From the mere fact of our conceiving that anotherperson takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Cor.) we shallourselves love that thing and desire to take delight therein. Butwe assumed that the pleasure in question would be prevented byanother's delight in its object; we shall, therefore, endeavour toprevent his possession thereof (III. xxviii.). Q.E.D.

*****Note—We thus see that man's nature is generally soconstituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and enviesthose who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned tohis own love for the goods in their possession. Further, we seethat from the same property of human nature, whence it followsthat men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious andambitious. Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shallfind that she entirely confirms what we have said; more especiallyif we turn our attention to the first years of our life. We find thatchildren, whose body is continually, as it were, in equilibrium,laugh or cry simply because they see others laughing or crying;moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate whatever they seeothers doing, and to possess themselves of whatever theyconceive as delighting others: inasmuch as the images of thingsare, as we have said, modifications of the human body, ormodes wherein the human body is affected and disposed byexternal causes to act in this or that manner.

XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves we endeavour,as far as we can, to bring about that it should love us in return.

>>>>>Proof—That which we love we endeavour, as far as wecan, to conceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.). If thething be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect itpleasurably in preference to anything else (III. xxix.). In otherwords, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it about,that the thing should be affected with pleasure accompanied bythe idea of ourselves, that is (III. xiii. note), that it should loveus in return. Q.E.D.

XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive aloved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be ourcomplacency.

>>>>>Proof—We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, tobring about, that what we love should love us in return: in otherwords, that what we love should be affected with pleasureaccompanied by the idea of ourself as cause. Therefore, inproportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affectedbecause of us, our endeavour will be assisted. —that is (III. xi.and note) the greater will be our pleasure. But when we takepleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something similarto ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. xxx);therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive aloved object to be affected, &c. Q.E.D.

XXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love joinsitself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himselfhas attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards theloved object and with envy towards his rival.

>>>>>Proof—In proportion as a man thinks, that a lovedobject is well affected towards him, will be the strength ofhis self-approval (by the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note),of his pleasure; he will, therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour,as far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closelybound to him: this endeavour or desire will be increased, ifhe thinks that someone else has a similar desire (III. xxxi.).But this endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked bythe image of the loved object in conjunction with the imageof him whom the loved object has joined to itself; therefore(III. xi. note) he will for that reason be affected with pain,accompanied by the idea of the loved object as a cause inconjunction with the image of his rival; that is, he will be(III. xiii.) affected with hatred towards the loved objectand also towards his rival (III. xv. Cor.), which latter hewill envy as enjoying the beloved object. Q.E.D.

*****Note—This hatred towards an object of love joinedwith envy is called "Jealousy," which accordingly is nothingelse but a wavering of the disposition arising from combinedlove and hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival whois envied. Further, this hatred towards the object of love willbe greater, in proportion to the pleasure which the jealousman had been wont to derive from the reciprocated love ofthe said object; and also in proportion to the feelings he hadpreviously entertained towards his rival. If he had hated him,he will forthwith hate the object of his love, because heconceives it is pleasurably affected by one whom he himselfhates: and also because he is compelled to associate the imageof his loved one with the image of him whom he hates. Thiscondition generally comes into play in the case of love for awoman: for he who thinks, that a woman whom he lovesprostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not only becausehis own desire is restrained, but also because, being compelledto associate the image of her he loves with the parts of shameand the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks from her.

We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his belovedwith the same joyful countenance as before, and this also giveshim pain as a lover, as I will now show.

XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once takendelight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances aswhen he first took delight therein.

>>>>>Proof—Everything, which a man has seen in conjunctionwith the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause ofpleasure (III. xv.); he will, therefore, desire to possess it, inconjunction with that wherein he has taken delight; in other words,he will desire to possess the object of his love under the samecircumstances as when he first took delight therein. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of theaforesaid attendant circumstances be missing.

>>>>>Proof—For, in so far as he finds some circumstance tobe missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence.As he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing orcircumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he conceivesit to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.). Q.E.D.

*****This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence ofthe object of love, is called "Regret."

XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred orlove, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.

>>>>>Proof—Pain diminishes or constrains a man's powerof activity (III. xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes orconstrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in hisown being; therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said endeavour:thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are directedto removing that pain. But (by the definition of pain), in proportionas the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily opposed to a greaterpart of man's power of activity; therefore the greater the pain,the greater the power of activity employed to remove it; that is,the greater will be the desire or appetite in endeavouring toremove it. Again, since pleasure (III. xi. note) increases or aidsa man's power of activity, it may easily be shown in like manner,that a man affected by pleasure has no desire further than topreserve it, and his desire will be in proportion to the magnitudeof the pleasure.

Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of painand pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour, appetite,or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be greater inproportion to the hatred or love. Q.E.D.

XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, sothat love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal,regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, andhis hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love.

>>>>>Proof—If a man begins to hate that which he had loved,more of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had neverloved it. For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a manendeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.);he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, andby affecting it as far as he can pleasurably; this endeavour isgreater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is theendeavour to bring about that the beloved should return hisaffection (III. xxxiii.). Now these endeavours are constrainedby hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Cor. and III. xxiii.);wherefore the love (III. xi. note) will for this cause also beaffected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love hasbeen greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by hatred,there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the object;wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater pain,or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never lovedit, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former lovewas greater. Q.E.D.

XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him aninjury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrueto himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by thesame law, seek to benefit him.

>>>>>Proof—To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive himas a cause of pain; therefore he who hates a man will endeavourto remove or destroy him. But if anything more painful, or, inother words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater thereby—and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not carryingout the injury, which he planned against the object of his hatred—he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury (III. xxviii.),and the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.) will be greaterthan his former endeavour to do injury, and will therefore prevailover it, as we asserted. The second part of this proof proceedsin the same manner. Wherefore he who hates another, etc.Q.E.D.

*****Note—By "good" I here mean every kind of pleasure,and all that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies ourlongings, whatsoever they may be. By "evil," I mean every kindof pain, especially that which frustrates our longings. For I haveshown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because wedeem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good becausewe desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrinkfrom; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions,judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better,what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst. Thus amiser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want ofmoney the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much asglory, and fears nothing so much as shame. To an envious mannothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothingmore painful than another's success. So every man, accordingto his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful oruseless. The emotion, which induces a man to turn from thatwhich he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, iscalled "timidity," which may accordingly be defined as "the fearwhereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards asfuture by encountering a lesser evil" (III. xxviii.). But if the evilwhich he fears be shame, timidity becomes "bashfulness."Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by thefear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose,fear becomes "consternation," especially if both the evils fearedbe very great.

XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, andbelieves that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hatethat other in return.

>>>>>Proof—He who conceives another as affected withhatred, will thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III.xxvii.), that is, with pain, accompanied by the idea of anexternal cause. But, by the hypothesis, he conceives nocause for this pain except him who is his enemy; therefore,from conceiving that he is hated by some one, he will beaffected with pain, accompanied by the idea of his enemy;in other words, he will hate his enemy in return. Q.E.D.

*****Note—He who thinks that he has given just cause forhatred will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame; butthis case (III. xxv.) rarely happens. This reciprocation of hatredmay also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour toinjure the object of our hate (III. xxxix.). He therefore whoconceives that he is hated by another will conceive his enemyas the cause of some evil or pain; thus he will be affected withpain or fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause;in other words, he will be affected with hatred towards hisenemy, as I said above.

<<<<<Corollary I—He who conceives, that one whom he loveshates him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. For, inso far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he isdetermined to hate his enemy in return. But, by the hypothesis,he nevertheless loves him: wherefore he will be a prey toconflicting hatred and love.

<<<<<Corollary II—If a man conceives that one, whom he hashitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury frommotives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury inkind.

>>>>>Proof—He who conceives, that another hates him, will(by the last proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.)will endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully;he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.).Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injurydone to himself; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to repayit in kind. Q.E.D.

*****Note—The endeavour to injure one whom we hate iscalled "Anger;" the endeavour to repay in kind injury done toourselves is called "Revenge."

XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, andbelieves that he has given no cause for such love, he will lovethat other in return. (Cf. XIII. xv. Cor., and III. xvi.)

>>>>>Proof—This proposition is proved in the same way asthe preceding one. See also the note appended thereto.

*****Note—If he believes that he has given just cause for thelove, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note); this is whatmost often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its contrarytook place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated byanother. (See note to preceding proposition.) This reciprocallove, and consequently the desire of benefiting him who lovesus (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is called"gratitude" or "thankfulness." It thus appears that men are muchmore prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.

<<<<<Corollary—He who imagines that he is loved by onewhom he hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.This is proved in the same way as the first corollary of thepreceding proposition.

*****Note—If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he willendeavour to injure him who loves him; this emotion is calledcruelty, especially if the victim be believed to have given noordinary cause for hatred.

XLII. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motivesof love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the benefit isreceived without gratitude.

>>>>>Proof—When a man loves something similar to himself,he endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he shouldbe loved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.). Therefore he who hasconferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, whichhe feels of being loved in return; that is (III. xxxiv.) from the hopeof honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure; hence he will endeavour,as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or to regardit as actually existing. But, by the hypothesis, he conceivessomething else, which excludes the existence of the said causeof honour: wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III. xix.). Q.E.D.

XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can onthe other hand be destroyed by love.

>>>>>Proof—He who conceives, that an object of his hatredhates him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while theformer hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.). But if, onthe other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him,he will to this extent (III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure,and (III. xxix.) will endeavour to please the cause of his emotion.In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III. xli.), andnot to affect him painfully; this endeavour (III. xxxvii.) will begreater or less in proportion to the emotion from which it arises.Therefore, if it be greater than that which arises from hatred,and through which the man endeavours to affect painfully thething which he hates, it will get the better of it and banish thehatred from his mind. Q.E.D.

XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passesinto love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had notpreceded it.

>>>>>Proof—The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop.xxxviii. of this Part: for he who begins to love a thing, which hewas wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact ofloving feels pleasure. To this pleasure involved in love is addedthe pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to removethe pain involved in hatred (III. xxxvii.), accompanied by theidea of the former object of hatred as cause.

*****Note—Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hateanything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoyingthis greater pleasure; that is, no one will desire that he shouldbe injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor longto be ill for the sake of getting well. For everyone will alwaysendeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as far ashe can. If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a man shoulddesire to hate someone, in order that he might love him the morethereafter, he will always desire to hate him. For the strength oflove is in proportion to the strength of the hatred, wherefore theman would desire, that the hatred be continually increased moreand more, and, for a similar reason, he would desire to becomemore and more ill, in order that he might take a greater pleasurein being restored to health: in such a case he would alwaysendeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.) is absurd.

XLV. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself hatesanything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will hate thatperson.

>>>>>Proof—The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towardshim who hates it (III. xl.); therefore the lover, in conceiving thatanyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing asaffected by hatred, in other words (III. xiii.), by pain; consequentlyhe is himself affected by pain accompanied by the idea of thehater of the beloved thing as cause; that is, he will hate him whohates anything which he himself loves (III. xiii. note). Q.E.D.

XLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully byanyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if thepleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the saidstranger as cause, under the general category of the class ornation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the individualstranger, but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs.

>>>>>Proof—This is evident from III. xvi.

XLVII. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate isdestroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied bya certain pain in us.

>>>>>Proof—This is evident from III. xxvii. For in so far aswe conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain,we ourselves feel pain.

*****Note—This proposition can also be proved from theCorollary to II. xvii. Whenever we remember anything, evenif it does not actually exist, we regard it only as present, andthe body is affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so faras the remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determinedto regard it with pain; this determination, while the image of thething in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembranceof other things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing,but is not destroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in sofar as the said determination is checked: for this reason thejoy arising from the injury done to what we hate is repeated,every time we remember that object of hatred. For, as wehave said, when the image of the thing in question, is aroused,inasmuch as it involves the thing's existence, it determines theman to regard the thing with the same pain as he was wont todo, when it actually did exist. However, since he has joinedto the image of the thing other images, which exclude itsexistence, this determination to pain is forthwith checked, andthe man rejoices afresh as often as the repetition takes place.This is the cause of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, anddelight in narrating dangers from which they have escaped.For when men conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future,and are determined to fear it; this determination is checkedafresh by the idea of freedom, which became associated withthe idea of the danger when they escaped therefrom:this renders them secure afresh: therefore they rejoice afresh.

XLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is destroyed,if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain involved in thelatter emotion, be associated with the idea of another cause: andwill be diminished in proportion as we conceive Peter not to havebeen the sole cause of either emotion.

>>>>>Proof—This Prop. is evident from the mere definitionof love and hatred (III. xiii. note). For pleasure is called lovetowards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simplyin so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or theother. When this condition of causality is either wholly or partlyremoved, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in partvanishes. Q.E.D.

XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceiveto be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater thanif it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.

>>>>>Proof—A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def.vii.) be perceived through itself without anything else. If, therefore,we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we shall therefore(III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall do so with the utmostlove or hatred that can arise from the given emotion. But if thething which causes the emotion be conceived as acting bynecessity, we shall then (by the same Def. vii. Part I.) conceiveit not as the sole cause, but as one of the causes of the emotion,and therefore our love or hatred towards it will be less. Q.E.D.

*****Note—Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselvesto be free, feel more love or hatred towards one another thantowards anything else: to this consideration we must add theimitation of emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii.

L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope orfear.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition is proved in the same way asIII. xv., which see, together with the note to III. xviii.

*****Note—Things which are accidentally the causes of hopeor fear are called good or evil omens. Now, in so far as suchomens are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitionsof hope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also ofpleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard themwith love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them asmeans towards that which we hope for, or to remove them asobstacles, or causes of that which we fear. It follows, further,from III. xxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believereadily in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that whichwe fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects aboveor below their true value. Hence there have arisen superstitions,whereby men are everywhere assailed. However, I do notthink it worth while to point out here the vacillations springingfrom hope and fear; it follows from the definition of theseemotions, that there can be no hope without fear, and no fearwithout hope, as I will duly explain in the proper place. Further,in so far as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with loveor hatred; thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fearwhat we have said concerning love and hatred.

LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same object,and the same man may be differently affected at different timesby the same object.

>>>>>Proof—The human body is affected by external bodiesin a variety of ways (II. Post. iii.). Two men may therefore bedifferently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. i.after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) may be differently affected by oneand the same object. Further (by the same Post.) the humanbody can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another;consequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affectedat different times by one and the same object. Q.E.D.

*****Note—We thus see that it is possible, that what one manloves another may hate, and that what one man fears another maynot fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what heonce hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on.Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good,what bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it followsthat men's judgments may vary no less than their emotions*, hencewhen we compare some with others, we distinguish them solelyby the diversity of their emotions, and style some intrepid, otherstimid, others by some other epithet. For instance, I shall call aman "intrepid," if he despises an evil which I am accustomed tofear; if I further take into consideration, that, in his desire to injurehis enemies and to benefit those whom he loves, he is notrestrained by the fear of an evil which is sufficient to restrain me,I shall call him "daring." Again, a man will appear "timid" to me,if he fears an evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if Ifurther take into consideration that his desire is restrained by thefear of an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall saythat he is "cowardly;" and in like manner will everyone passjudgment.[*This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divineintellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.]

Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human judgment,inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his emotions,and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause pleasure orpain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent, are oftenpurely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of things alludedto in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that a man may be atone time affected with pleasure, and at another with pain,accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. Thus we can easilyunderstand what are "Repentance" and "Self-complacency.""Repentance" is "pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self ascause;" "Self-complacency" is "pleasure, accompanied by theidea of one's self as cause," and these emotions are most intensebecause men believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.).

LII. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction withothers, and which we do not conceive to have any property thatis not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so long,as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiarto itself.

>>>>>Proof—As soon as we conceive an object which we haveseen in conjunction with others, we at once remember thoseothers (II. xviii. and note), and thus we pass forthwith from thecontemplation of one object to the contemplation of anotherobject. And this is the case with the object, which we conceiveto have no property that is not common to many. For wethereupon assume that we are regarding therein nothing, whichwe have not before seen in conjunction with other objects.But when we suppose that we conceive an object somethingspecial, which we have never seen before, we must needs saythat the mind, while regarding that object, has in itself nothingwhich it can fall to regarding instead thereof; therefore it isdetermined to the contemplation of that object only. Thereforean object, &c. Q.E.D.

*****Note—This mental modification, or imagination of aparticular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called"Wonder;" but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called"Consternation," because wonder at an evil keeps a man soengrossed in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has nopower to think of anything else whereby he might avoid theevil. If, however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence,industry, or anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man,is thereby regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder iscalled "Veneration;" otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c.,be what we wonder at, the emotion is called "Horror." Again,if it be the prudence, industry, or what not, of a man we love,that we wonder at, our love will on this account be the greater(III. xii.), and when joined to wonder or veneration is called"Devotion." We may in like manner conceive hatred, hope,confidence, and the other emotions, as associated with wonder;and we should thus be able to deduce more emotions thanthose which have obtained names in ordinary speech. Whenceit is evident, that the names of the emotions have been appliedin accordance rather with their ordinary manifestations than withan accurate knowledge of their nature.

To wonder is opposed "Contempt," which generally arises from the fact that, because we see someone wondering at,loving, or fearing something, or because something, at first sight,appears to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love,fear, &c., we are, in consequence (III. xv. Cor. and III. xxvii.),determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing. But if from thepresence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing, weare compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause ofwonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of thething, remains determined to think rather of those qualities whichare not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on the otherhand, the presence of the object would cause it more particularlyto regard that which is therein. As devotion springs from wonderat a thing which we love, so does "Derision" spring from contemptof a thing which we hate or fear, and "Scorn" from contempt offolly, as veneration from wonder at prudence. Lastly, we canconceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c., in associationwith contempt, and can thence deduce other emotions, which arenot distinguished one from another by any recognized name.

LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity,it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in proportion to thedistinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power ofactivity.

>>>>>Proof—A man does not know himself except through themodifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and xxiii.).When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate itself, it is therebyassumed to pass to a greater perfection, or (III. xi. note) to feelpleasure; and the pleasure will be greater in proportion to thedistinctness, wherewith it is able to conceive itself and its ownpower of activity. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—This pleasure is fostered more and more, inproportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others.For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the morehe will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompaniedby the idea of himself (III. xxix. note); thus he is (III. xxvii.)himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the ideaof himself. Q.E.D.

LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assertits power of activity.

>>>>>Proof—The endeavour or power of the mind is the actualessence thereof (III. vii.); but the essence of the mind obviouslyonly affirms that which the mind is and can do; not that which itneither is nor can do; therefore the mind endeavours to conceiveonly such things as assert or affirm its power of activity. Q.E.D.

LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels painthereat.

>>>>>Proof—The essence of the mind only affirms that whichthe mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature toconceive only such things as assert its power of activity (lastProp.). Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its ownweakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attemptingto conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it ischecked in its endeavour — in other words (III. xi. note), it feelspain. Q.E.D.

<<<<<Corollary—This pain is more and more fostered, if a manconceives that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in thesame way as the corollary to III. liii.

*****Note—This pain, accompanied by the idea of our ownweakness, is called "humility;" the pleasure, which springs fromthe contemplation of ourselves, is called "self-love" or "self-complacency." And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed asoften as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own powerof activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his ownexploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind,and also that, for this reason, men are troublesome to oneanother. Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III.xxiv. note, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomingsof their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues. For whenevera man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure(III. liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection,and he conceives them more distinctly — that is (II. xl. note),in proportion as he can distinguish them from others, andregard them as something special. Therefore, a man will takemost pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplatessome quality which he denies to others. But, if that which heaffirms of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animalsin general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on thecontrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fallshort when compared with those of others. This pain (III.xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrongconstruction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far ashe can, embellishing his own.

It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred andenvy, which latter is fostered by their education. For parentsare accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely by the spurof honour and envy. But, perhaps, some will scruple to assentto what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's virtues,and venerate their possessors. In order to remove such doubts,I append the following corollary.

<<<<<Corollary—No one envies the virtue of anyone who isnot his equal.

>>>>>Proof—Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or(III. xiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification wherebya man's power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, ischecked. But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything,which cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a manwill not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the samething) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to another'snature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot be checked,nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue in some oneunlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an one. Buthe can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same natureas himself. Q.E.D.

*****Note—When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii.,we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude,&c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to bepeculiar to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore,no more envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall,or lions for being courageous.

LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire,and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillationsof spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear,&c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected.

>>>>>Proof—Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotionscompounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, orpassive states (III. xi. note); now we are necessarily passive(III. i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in sofar as we have such ideas are we passive (III. iii.); that is, weare only necessarily passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we conceive,or (II. xvii. and note) in so far as we are affected by an emotion,which involves the nature of our own body, and the nature of anexternal body. Wherefore the nature of every passive state mustnecessarily be so explained, that the nature of the object wherebywe are affected be expressed. Namely, the pleasure, whicharises from, say, the object A, involves the nature of that objectA, and the pleasure, which arises from the object B, involvesthe nature of the object B; different, inasmuch as the causeswhence they arise are by nature different. So again the emotionof pain, which arises from one object, is by nature different fromthe pain arising from another object, and, similarly, in the caseof love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation, &c.

Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain, love,hatred, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we areaffected. Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so faras it is conceived as determined to a particular action by anygiven modification of itself (III. ix. note); therefore, accordingas a man is affected through external causes by this or that kindof pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words, accordingas his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so will his desirebe of one kind or another, and the nature of one desire mustnecessarily differ from the nature of another desire, as widelyas the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose. Thus thereare as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of pleasure,pain, love, &c., consequently (by what has been shown) thereare as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objectswhereby we are affected. Q.E.D.

*****Note—Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the lastproposition, must be very numerous, the chief are "luxury,""drunkenness," "lust," "avarice," and "ambition," being merelyspecies of love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotionsin a manner varying according to the object, with which they areconcerned. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition,&c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking,venery, riches, and fame. Furthermore, these emotions, in sofar as we distinguish them from others merely by the objectswherewith they are concerned, have no contraries. For"temperance," "sobriety," and "chastity," which we are wontto oppose to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotionsor passive states, but indicate a power of the mind whichmoderates the last-named emotions. However, I cannot hereexplain the remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they areas numerous as the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would itbe necessary. It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, todetermine the strength of the emotions, and the mind's powerover them, to have a general definition of each emotion. It issufficient, I repeat, to understand the general properties of theemotions and the mind, to enable us to determine the qualityand extent of the mind's power in moderating and checkingthe emotions. Thus, though there is a great difference betweenvarious emotions of love, hatred, or desire, for instancebetween love felt towards children, and love felt towards a wife,there is no need for us to take cognizance of such differences,or to track out further the nature and origin of the emotions.

LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotionof another individual, only in so far as the essence of the oneindividual differs from the essence of the other.

>>>>>Proof—This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (whichsee after Lemma iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.). Nevertheless, we willprove it from the nature of the three primary emotions.

All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain, astheir definitions above given show. But desire is each man'snature or essence (III. ix. note); therefore desire in one individualdiffers from desire in another individual, only in so far as thenature or essence of the one differs from the nature or essenceof the other. Again, pleasure and pain are passive states orpassions, whereby every man's power or endeavour to persistin his being is increased or diminished, helped or hindered (III.xi. and note). But by the endeavour to persist in its being, inso far as it is attributable to mind and body in conjunction, wemean appetite and desire (III. ix. note); therefore pleasure andpain are identical with desire or appetite, in so far as byexternal causes they are increased or diminished, helped orhindered, in other words, they are every man's nature; whereforethe pleasure and pain felt by one man differ from the pleasureand pain felt by another man, only in so far as the nature oressence of the one man differs from the essence of the other;consequently, any emotion of one individual only differs, &c.Q.E.D.

*****Note—Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animalswhich are called irrational (for after learning the origin of mindwe cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's emotions,to the extent that brute nature differs from human nature. Horseand man are alike carried away by the desire of procreation; butthe desire of the former is equine, the desire of the latter is human.So also the lusts and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds mustneeds very according to the several natures. Thus, although eachindividual lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging tohim wherein he has his being, yet the life, wherein each is contentand rejoices, is nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the saidindividual, and hence the joy of one only differs in nature fromthe joy of another, to the extent that the essence of one differsfrom the essence of another. Lastly, it follows from the foregoingproposition, that there is no small difference between the joywhich actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by aphilosopher, as I just mention here by the way. Thus far Ihave treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far ashe is passive. It remains to add a few words on thoseattributable to him in so far as he is active.

LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities orpassions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure anddesire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.

>>>>>Proof—When the mind conceives itself and its powerof activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind necessarilycontemplates itself, when it conceives a true or adequate idea(II. xliii). But the mind does conceive certain adequate ideas(II. xl. note ii.). Therefore it feels pleasure in so far as it is active(III. i.). Again, the mind, both in so far as it has clear anddistinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavoursto persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such an endeavourwe mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.); therefore,desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we understand,or (III. i.) in so far as we are active. Q.E.D.

LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active,there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or desire.

>>>>>Proof—All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure,or pain, as their definitions, already given, show. Now by painwe mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished orchecked (III. xi. and note); therefore, in so far as the mindfeels pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, isdiminished or checked (III. i.); therefore, no painful emotionscan be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, butonly emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.)are attributable to the mind in that condition. Q.E.D.

*****Note—All actions following from emotion, which areattributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I setdown to "strength of character" ("fortitudo"), which I divideinto "courage" ("animositas") and "highmindedness"("generositas"). By "courage" I mean "the desire wherebyevery man strives to preserve his own being in accordancesolely with the dictates of reason." By "highmindedness" Imean "the desire whereby every man endeavours, solelyunder the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to unitethem to himself in friendship." Those actions, therefore,which have regard solely to the good of the agent I setdown to courage, those which aim at the good of others Iset down to highmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety,and presence of mind in danger, &c., are varieties of courage;courtesy, mercy, &c., are varieties of highmindedness.

I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their primarycauses the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit, whicharise from the combination of the three primary emotions, to wit,desire, pleasure, and pain. It is evident from what I have said,that we are in many ways driven about by external causes, andthat like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds we toss toand fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate. But I have said,that I have only set forth the chief conflicting emotions, not allthat might be given. For, by proceeding in the same way asabove, we can easily show that love is united to repentance,scorn, shame, &c. I think everyone will agree from what hasbeen said, that the emotions may be compounded one withanother in so many ways, and so many variations may arisetherefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation. However,for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the mostimportant; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would bemore curious than profitable. It remains to remark concerninglove, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying athing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment,acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in anotherway, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mindbegins to conceive and desire something fresh. For example,when we conceive something which generally delights us withits flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it. But whilst weare thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body isotherwise disposed. If, therefore, when the body is thusotherwise disposed, the image of the food which is presentbe stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire toeat it be stimulated also, the new disposition of the bodywill feel repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequentlythe presence of the food which we formerly longed for willbecome odious. This revulsion of feeling is called "satiety"or weariness. For the rest, I have neglected the outwardmodifications of the body observable in emotions, such,for instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c.,for these are attributable to the body only, without anyreference to the mind. Lastly, the definitions of the emotionsrequire to be supplemented in a few points; I will thereforerepeat them, interpolating such observations as I think shouldhere and there be added.

DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS

I. "Desire" is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived,as determined to a particular activity by some given modificationof itself.

^^^^^Explanation—We have said above, in the note toProp. ix. of this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousnessthereof; further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so faras it is determined to act in a way tending to promote its ownpersistence. But, in the same note, I also remarked that,strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetiteand desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetiteor not, it remains one and the same appetite. Thus, in orderto avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained fromexplaining desire by appetite; but I have taken care to defineit in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, allthose endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish bythe terms appetite, will, desire, or impulse. I might, indeed,have said, that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it isconceived as determined to a particular activity; but fromsuch a definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that themind can be conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore,in order to imply the cause of such consciousness, it wasnecessary to add, "in so far as it is determined by some givenmodification," &c. For, by a modification of man's essence,we understand every disposition of the said essence, whethersuch disposition be innate, or whether it be conceived solelyunder the attribute of thought, or solely under the attributeof extension, or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneouslyto both these attributes. By the term desire, then, I heremean all man's endeavours, impulses, appetites, and volitions,which vary according to each man's disposition, and are,therefore, not seldom opposed one to another, accordingas a man is drawn in different directions, and knows notwhere to turn.

II. "Pleasure" is the transition of a man from a less to a greaterperfection.

III. "Pain" is the transition of a man from a greater to a lessperfection.

^^^^^Explanation—I say transition: for pleasure is notperfection itself. For, if man were born with the perfectionto which he passes, he would possess the same, without theemotion of pleasure. This appears more clearly from theconsideration of the contrary emotion, pain. No one candeny, that pain consists in the transition to a less perfection,and not in the less perfection itself: for a man cannot bepained, in so far as he partakes of perfection of any degree.Neither can we say, that pain consists in the absence of agreater perfection. For absence is nothing, whereas theemotion of pain is an activity; wherefore this activity canonly be the activity of transition from a greater to a lessperfection—in other words, it is an activity whereby a man'spower of action is lessened or constrained (cf. III. xi. note).I pass over the definitions of merriment, stimulation, melancholy,and grief, because these terms are generally used in referenceto the body, and are merely kinds of pleasure or pain.

IV. "Wonder" is the conception (imaginatio) of anything,wherein the mind comes to a stand, because the particularconcept in question has no connection with other concepts(cf. III. lii. and note).

^^^^^Explanation—In the note to II. xviii. we showed thereason, why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing,straightway falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely,because the images of the two things are so associated andarranged, that one follows the other. This state of associationis impossible, if the image of the thing be new; the mind willthen be at a stand in the contemplation thereof, until it isdetermined by other causes to think of something else.

Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself,is of the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do notinclude wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why Ishould so include it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mindarises from no positive cause drawing away the mind fromother objects, but merely from the absence of a cause,which should determine the mind to pass from thecontemplation of one object to the contemplation of another.

I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary emotions(as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure, pain, anddesire. I have spoken of wonder simply because it is customaryto speak of certain emotions springing from the three primitiveones by different names, when they are referred to the objectsof our wonder. I am led by the same motive to add a definitionof contempt.

V. "Contempt" is the conception of anything which touchesthe mind so little, that its presence leads the mind to imaginethose qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it(cf. III. lii. note).

The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for
I am not aware that any emotions are named after them.

VI. "Love" is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an externalcause.

^^^^^Explanation—This definition explains sufficiently clearlythe essence of love; the definition given by those authors whosay that love is "the lover's wish to unite himself to the lovedobject" expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and,as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence,they have been unable to acquire a true conception of itsproperties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admittedto be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when Isay that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish tounite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by"wish" consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind(for I have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neitherdo I mean a desire of being united to the loved object whenit is absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand;for love can be conceived without either of these desires; butby "wish" I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, onaccount of the presence of the beloved object, whereby thepleasure of the lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.

VII. "Hatred" is pain, accompanied by the idea of an externalcause.

^^^^^Explanation—These observations are easily graspedafter what has been said in the explanation of the precedingdefinition (cf. also III. xiii. note).

VIII. "Inclination" is pleasure, accompanied by the idea ofsomething which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.

IX. "Aversion" is pain, accompanied by the idea of somethingwhich is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).

X. "Devotion" is love towards one whom we admire.

^^^^^Explanation—Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we haveshown, III. lii.) from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, ithappens that the object of our wonder is often conceivedby us, we shall cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that theemotion of devotion readily degenerates into simple love.

XI. "Derision" is pleasure arising from our conceiving thepresence of a quality, which we despise, in an object whichwe hate.

^^^^^Explanation—In so far as we despise a thing which wehate, we deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to thatextent rejoice (III. xx.). But since we assume that man hatesthat which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in questionis not without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note).

XII. "Hope" is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the ideaof something past or future, whereof we to a certain extentdoubt the issue.

XIII. "Fear" is an inconstant pain arising from the idea ofsomething past or future, whereof we to a certain extentdoubt the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).

^^^^^Explanation—From these definitions it follows, thatthere is no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingledwith hope. For he, who depends on hope and doubtsconcerning the issue of anything, is assumed to conceivesomething, which excludes the existence of the said thingin the future; therefore he, to this extent, feels pain (cf. III.xix.); consequently, while dependent on hope, he fearsfor the issue. Contrariwise he, who fears, in other wordsdoubts, concerning the issue of something which he hates,also conceives something which excludes the existence ofthe thing in question; to this extent he feels pleasure, andconsequently to this extent he hopes that it will turn out ashe desires (III. xx.).

XIV. "Confidence" is pleasure arising from the idea ofsomething past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt hasbeen removed.

XV. "Despair" is pain arising from the idea of something pastor future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

^^^^^Explanation—Thus confidence springs from hope, anddespair from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issueof an event has been removed: this comes to pass, becauseman conceives something past or future as present andregards it as such, or else because he conceives other things,which exclude the existence of the causes of his doubt. For,although we can never be absolutely certain of the issueof any particular event (II. xxxi. Cor.), it may neverthelesshappen that we feel no doubt concerning it. For we haveshown, that to feel no doubt concerning a thing is not thesame as to be quite certain of it (II. xlix. note). Thus itmay happen that we are affected by the same emotionof pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or future, asconcerning the conception of a thing present; this I havealready shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I referthe reader.

XVI. "Joy" is pleasure accompanied by the idea ofsomething past, which has had an issue beyond our hope.

XVII. "Disappointment" is pain accompanied by the ideaof something past, which has had an issue contrary to ourhope.

XVIII. "Pity" is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, whichhas befallen someone else whom we conceive to be likeourselves (cf. III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).

^^^^^Explanation—Between pity and sympathy (misericordia)there seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the formerterm is used in reference to a particular action, and the latterin reference to a disposition.

XIX. "Approval" is love towards one who has done good toanother.

XX. "Indignation" is hatred towards one who has done evil toanother.

^^^^^Explanation—I am aware that these terms are employedin senses somewhat different from those usually assigned. Butmy purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but thenature of things. I therefore make use of such terms, as mayconvey my meaning without any violent departure from theirordinary signification. One statement of my method will suffice.As for the cause of the above-named emotions see III. xxvii.Cor. i., and III. xxii. note.

XXI. "Partiality" is thinking too highly of anyone because ofthe love we bear him.

^^^^^Explanation—Thus partiality is an effect of love, anddisparagement an effect of hatred: so that "partiality" mayalso be defined as "love, in so far as it induces a man tothink too highly of a beloved object." Contrariwise,"disparagement" may be defined as "hatred, in so far asit induces a man to think too meanly of a hated object."Cf. III. xxvi. note.

XXIII. "Envy" is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to bepained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another'sevil fortune.

^^^^^Explanation—Envy is generally opposed to sympathy,which, by doing some violence to the meaning of the word,may therefore be thus defined:

XXIV. "Sympathy" (misericordia) is love, in so far as itinduces a man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune,and pain at another's evil fortune.

^^^^^Explanation—Concerning envy see the notes to II.xxiv. and xxxii. These emotions also arise from pleasureor pain accompanied by the idea of something external, ascause either in itself or accidentally. I now pass on to otheremotions, which are accompanied by the idea of somethingwithin as a cause.

XXV. "Self-approval" is pleasure arising from a man'scontemplation of himself and his own power of action.

XXVI. "Humility" is pain arising from a man's contemplationof his own weakness of body or mind.

^^^^^Explanation—Self-complacency is opposed tohumility, in so far as we thereby mean pleasure arising froma contemplation of our own power of action; but, in so faras we mean thereby pleasure accompanied by the idea ofany action which we believe we have performed by the freedecision of our mind, it is opposed to repentance, which wemay thus define:

XXVII. "Repentance" is pain accompanied by the idea ofsome action, which we believe we have performed by thefree decision of our mind.

^^^^^Explanation—The causes of these emotions we haveset forth in III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note.Concerning the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note.This is perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it isnothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonlycalled "wrong," are followed by pain, and all those, which arecalled "right," are followed by pleasure. We can easily gatherfrom what has been said, that this depends in great measureon education. Parents, by reprobating the former class ofactions, and by frequently chiding their children because ofthem, and also by persuading to and praising the latter class,have brought it about, that the former should be associatedwith pain and the latter with pleasure. This is confirmed byexperience. For custom and religion are not the sameamong all men, but that which some consider sacred othersconsider profane, and what some consider honourable othersconsider disgraceful. According as each man has beeneducated, he feels repentance for a given action or gloriestherein.

XXVIII. "Pride" is thinking too highly of one's self fromself-love.

^^^^^Explanation—Thus pride is different from partiality,for the latter term is used in reference to an external object,but pride is used of a man thinking too highly of himself.However, as partiality is the effect of love, so is pride theeffect or property of "self-love," which may therefore bethus defined, "love of self or self-approval, in so far as itleads a man to think too highly of himself." To this emotionthere is no contrary. For no one thinks too meanly ofhimself because of self-hatred; I say that no one thinks toomeanly of himself, in so far as he conceives that he isincapable of doing this or that. For whatsoever a manimagines that he is incapable of doing, he imagines this ofnecessity, and by that notion he is so disposed, that hereally cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot do.For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so longis he not determined to do it, and consequently so long isit impossible for him to do it. However, if we considersuch matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find itconceivable that a man may think too meanly of himself;for it may happen, that a man, sorrowfully regarding hisown weakness, should imagine that he is despised by allmen, while the rest of the world are thinking of nothing lessthan of despising him. Again, a man may think too meanlyof himself, if he deny of himself in the present somethingin relation to a future time of which he is uncertain. As,for instance, if he should say that he is unable to form anyclear conceptions, or that he can desire and do nothing butwhat is wicked and base, &c. We may also say, that a manthinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessivefear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals,venture. We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pridean emotion which I will call self-abasement, for as fromself-complacency springs pride, so from humility springsself-abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:

XXIX. "Self-abasement" is thinking too meanly of one'sself by reason of pain.

^^^^^Explanation—We are nevertheless generallyaccustomed to oppose pride to humility, but in that casewe pay more attention to the effect of either emotion thanto its nature. We are wont to call "proud" the man whoboasts too much (III. xxx. note), who talks of nothing buthis own virtues and other people's faults, who wishes tobe first; and lastly who goes through life with a style andpomp suitable to those far above him in station. On theother hand, we call "humble" the man who too often blushes,who confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues,and who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent ofhis attire. However, these emotions, humility andself-abasement, are extremely rare. For human nature,considered in itself, strives against them as much as it can(see III. xiii., liv.); hence those, who are believed to bemost self-abased and humble, are generally in reality themost ambitious and envious.

XXX. "Honour" (gloria) is pleasure accompanied by theidea of some action of our own, which we believe to bepraised by others.

XXXI. "Shame" is pain accompanied by the idea ofsome action of our own, which we believe to be blamedby others.

^^^^^Explanation—On this subject see the note to III. xxx.But we should here remark the difference which existsbetween shame and modesty. Shame is the pain followingthe deed whereof we are ashamed. Modesty is the fear ordread of shame, which restrains a man from committing abase action. Modesty is usually opposed to shamelessness,but the latter is not an emotion, as I will duly show; however,the names of the emotions (as I have remarked already)have regard rather to their exercise than to their nature.

I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotionsarising from pleasure and pain. I therefore proceed totreat of those which I refer to desire.

XXXII. "Regret" is the desire or appetite to possesssomething, kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing,and at the same time constrained by the remembranceof other things which exclude the existence of it.

^^^^^Explanation—When we remember a thing, we areby that very fact, as I have already said more than once,disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if itwere something present; but this disposition or endeavour,while we are awake, is generally checked by the imagesof things which exclude the existence of that which weremember. Thus when we remember something whichaffected us with a certain pleasure, we by that very factendeavour to regard it with the same emotion of pleasureas though it were present, but this endeavour is at oncechecked by the remembrance of things which exclude theexistence of the thing in question. Wherefore regret is,strictly speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure,which arises from the absence of something we hate (cf.III. xlvii. note). But, as the name regret seems to referto desire, I set this emotion down, among the emotionsspringing from desire.

XXXIII. "Emulation" is the desire of something, engenderedin us by our conception that others have the same desire.

^^^^^Explanation—He who runs away, because he seesothers running away, or he who fears, because he seesothers in fear; or again, he who, on seeing that another manhas burnt his hand, draws towards him his own hand, andmoves his body as though his own were burnt; such an onecan be said to imitate another's emotion, but not to emulatehim; not because the causes of emulation and imitation aredifferent, but because it has become customary to speakof emulation only in him, who imitates that which we deemto be honourable, useful, or pleasant. As to the cause ofemulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note. The reason why thisemotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen fromIII. xxxii. and note.

XXXIV. "Thankfulness" or "Gratitude" is the desire orzeal springing from love, whereby we endeavour to benefithim, who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefiton us. Cf. III. xxxix. note and xl.

XXXV. "Benevolence" is the desire of benefiting one whomwe pity. Cf. III. xxvii. note.

XXXVI. "Anger" is the desire, whereby through hatred weare induced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.

XXXVII. "Revenge" is the desire whereby we are induced,through mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similarfeelings, has injured us. (See III. xl. Cor. ii. and note.)

XXXVIII. "Cruelty" or "savageness" is the desire, wherebya man is impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.

^^^^^Explanation—To cruelty is opposed clemency, whichis not a passive state of the mind, but a power whereby manrestrains his anger and revenge.

XXXIX. "Timidity" is the desire to avoid a greater evil,which we dread, by undergoing a lesser evil. Cf. III. xxxix.note.

XL. "Daring" is the desire, whereby a man is set on to dosomething dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.

XLI. "Cowardice" is attributed to one, whose desire ischecked by the fear of some danger which his equals dareto encounter.

^^^^^Explanation—Cowardice is, therefore, nothing elsebut the fear of some evil, which most men are wont not tofear; hence I do not reckon it among the emotions springingfrom desire. Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain ithere, because, in so far as we look to the desire, it is trulyopposed to the emotion of daring.

XLII. "Consternation" is attributed to one, whose desire ofavoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which hefears.

^^^^^Explanation—Consternation is, therefore, a speciesof cowardice. But, inasmuch as consternation arises froma double fear, it may be more conveniently defined as afear which keeps a man so bewildered and wavering, thathe is not able to remove the evil. I say bewildered, in sofar as we understand his desire of removing the evil to beconstrained by his amazement. I say wavering, in so faras we understand the said desire to be constrained by thefear of another evil, which equally torments him: whenceit comes to pass that he knows not, which he may avertof the two. On this subject, see III. xxxix. note, and III.lii. note. Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li.note.

XLIII. "Courtesy," or "deference" (Humanitas seumodestia), is the desire of acting in a way that shouldplease men, and refraining from that which shoulddisplease them.

XLIV. "Ambition" is the immoderate desire of power.

^^^^^Explanation—Ambition is the desire, whereby all theemotions (cf. III. xxvii. and xxxi.) are fostered andstrengthened; therefore this emotion can with difficulty beovercome. For, so long as a man is bound by any desire,he is at the same time necessarily bound by this. "The bestmen," says Cicero, "are especially led by honour. Evenphilosophers, when they write a book contemning honour,sign their names thereto," and so on.

XLV. "Luxury" is excessive desire, or even love of livingsumptuously.

XLVI. "Intemperance" is the excessive desire and loveof drinking.

XLVII. "Avarice" is the excessive desire and love of riches.

XLVIII. "Lust" is desire and love in the matter of sexualintercourse.

^^^^^Explanation—Whether this desire be excessive ornot, it is still called lust. These last five emotions (as I haveshown in III. lvi.) have on contraries. For deference is aspecies of ambition. Cf. III. xxix. note.

Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety,and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of themind. It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, anambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating,drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fearare not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery.For an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself withfood and drink at another man's expense. An ambitiousman will restrain himself in nothing, so long as he thinks hisindulgences are secret; and if he lives among drunkardsand debauchees, he will, from the mere fact of beingambitious, be more prone to those vices. Lastly, a timidman does that which he would not. For though anavaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death,cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remainavaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, becausehe cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground ofabstention, cease to be lustful. In fact, these emotions arenot so much concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c.,as with the appetite and love of such. Nothing, therefore,can be opposed to these emotions, but high-mindednessand valour, whereof I will speak presently.

The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mindI pass over in silence, first, because they arise from thecompounding of the emotions already described; secondly,because many of them have no distinctive names, whichshows that it is sufficient for practical purposes to havemerely a general knowledge of them. However, it isestablished from the definitions of the emotions, which wehave set forth, that they all spring from desire, pleasure, orpain, or, rather, that there is nothing besides these three;wherefore each is wont to be called by a variety of namesin accordance with its various relations and extrinsic tokens.If we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions,and to what has been said concerning the nature of themind, we shall be able thus to define the emotions, in sofar as they are referred to the mind only.

GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS

Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is aconfused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning itsbody, or any part thereof, a force for existence (existendivis) greater or less than before, and by the presence ofwhich the mind is determined to think of one thing ratherthan another.

^^^^^Explanation—I say, first, that emotion or passionof the soul is "a confused idea." For we have shown thatthe mind is only passive, in so far as it has inadequate orconfused ideas. (III. iii.) I say, further, "whereby the mindaffirms concerning its body or any part thereof a force forexistence greater than before." For all the ideas of bodies,which we possess, denote rather the actual disposition ofour own body (II. xvi. Cor. ii.) than the nature of anexternal body. But the idea which constitutes the realityof an emotion must denote or express the disposition ofthe body, or of some part thereof, because its power ofaction or force for existence is increased or diminished,helped or hindered. But it must be noted that, when Isay "a greater or less force for existence than before," Ido not mean that the mind compares the present withthe past disposition of the body, but that the idea whichconstitutes the reality of an emotion affirms something ofthe body, which, in fact, involves more or less of realitythan before.

And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact(II. xi., xiii.), that it affirms the actual existence of its ownbody, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection thevery essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes togreater or less perfection, when it happens to affirmconcerning its own body, or any part thereof, somethinginvolving more or less reality than before.

When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mindis increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mindhad formed of its own body, or of some part thereof, anidea involving more or less of reality, than it had alreadyaffirmed concerning its own body. For the excellence ofideas, and the actual power of thinking are measured bythe excellence of the object. Lastly, I have added "by thepresence of which the mind is determined to think of onething rather than another," so that, besides the nature ofpleasure and pain, which the first part of the definitionexplains, I might also express the nature of desire.

END OF PART III

End of Project Gutenberg's The Ethics [Part III], by Benedict de Spinoza

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